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This study investigates the influence of corporate governance attributes on the 
likelihood of survival for 127 new economy IPO companies that listed on the ASX 
between 1994 to 2002. We use survival analysis techniques utilizing the Cox proportional 
hazards model with three main categories of corporate governance attributes; a) board size, 
b) board independence and c) ownership concentration We find that the survival time is 
negatively related to the percentage holdings of the top 20 shareholders. Our results also 
suggest that new economy IPO companies with low leverage and small company size are 
more likely to survive. However, the results indicate that board size and board 
independence do not explain the survival likelihood of new economy IPO firms. Our 
results suggest that corporate governance mechanisms that are designed specifically to 
protect minority shareholders and other providers of external capital are of little value 
during periods of extreme financial duress. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent high profile corporate failures such as Enron were attributed to corporate 
governance failures. An implication of this implicit linkage between corporate governance 
failure and corporate failure is that firms with higher quality governance are more likely to 
survive when confronted with challenging economic circumstances. Surprisingly, very 
little empirical attention has been devoted to this key issue. Hence we study the influence 
of corporate governance attributes on the likelihood of survival of IPOs in the aftermath of 
the internet shakeout.  
Our specific research focus is the potential relationship between board capital and 
corporate survival. Although there are several components of corporate governance, we 
concentrate on board structure and its influence on corporate survival. Arguably, board 
capital is the most important corporate governance mechanism as it is most likely to 
profoundly influence the survival likelihood of a firm that faces adverse economic 
circumstances. Typically, the board of directors enhance firm value in three ways.  Firstly, 
they monitor the performance of management. Secondly, they advise management 
regarding crucial strategic decisions. Finally, they provide access to resources at critical 
junctures to ensure survival. 
Our work is closely related to the work of Daily and Dalton (1994a) and Dowell, 
Shackell and Stuart (2007). Daily and Dalton (1994a) used a matched pair of bankrupt and 
surviving firms to examine the relationship between board capital and corporate survival. 
Their results show that bankrupt firms are more likely to have CEOs serving 
simultaneously as chairpersons. Bankrupt firms also have more affiliated directors than 
control firms, ceteris paribus. They also found a strong interactive effect between CEO-
board chairperson structure and the proportion of affiliated directors on the survival 
likelihood.  
Dowell, Shackell and Stuart (2007) in their study of internet firms examine firms that 
conducted their IPOs between 1996 and 1999. They find that board independence does not 
have an effect on the lifespan of the firm. However, they report that independent boards 
interact with founder-CEOs to hasten the firm’s failure. Another interesting finding 
reported by Dowell et al. pertains to the non-linear relationship between board size and 
corporate survival. They find that firms with either smaller or larger boards survive longer 
than those with intermediate-sized boards. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of governance mechanisms on 
corporate survival in Australia. The reason for selecting Australia is that it follows the 
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English common law tradition that is prevalent in the US and UK. Furthermore, Australia 
follows free market policies like the US. One of the problems in assessing the impact of 
corporate provisions on firm survival in the US is the existence of state level provisions 
regarding takeover. It is not clear what role state level provisions play on corporate 
survival. So, we chose a country which does not have state-level regulations on corporate 
governance. Our choice of the internet industry is based on obtaining a large enough 
sample that facilitates generalisation. 
We examine the corporate governance attributes that influence the likelihood of the 
survival of new economy IPOs companies in Australia. We focus on board capital, which 
is characterised by board size, board independence and CEO-Chairperson duality. We also 
consider ownership in our analysis. Furthermore, offering characteristics, financial ratios 
and company specific variables are also included as control variables. Our sample is 
composed of 127 new economy companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
between 1994 and 2002. Sample firms are tracked until 31 December 2007 to categorise 
them into companies that are currently trading, delisted and suspended. The Cox 
proportional hazards model is then employed to identify the likelihood of survival of a 
company after IPOs. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which investigates the survival of 
Australian IPOs focusing on the new economy sector. Although both Woo, Jeffrey and 
Lange (1995) and Lamberto and Rath (2008) study the survival of IPOs in Australia, 
neither study focused on the new economy sector. Furthermore, unlike some of the 
previous studies we allow for time-varying covariates in the Cox proportional hazards 
model rather than merely using time-invariant covariates (Woo, Jeffrey and Lange, 1995; 
Audretsch and Lehmann, 2004; Lamberto and Rath, 2008; Van der Goot, Van Giersbergen 
and Botman, 2008). This feature allows for deterioration in the covariates of financial 
ratios and company specific variables over time, since it is unlikely that their values or 
effects would remain constant with the progression of the corporate failure process (Luoma 
and Laitinen, 1991). LeClere (2005) suggests that the potential proportional hazards 
models with time-varying covariates outperforms proportional hazards models with time-
invariant covariates since it allows testing of the sensitivity of the proportional hazards 
model to the choice of covariate time-dependence in financial distress application. 
By focusing on a particular sector, namely the new economy sector, this study 
provides an opportunity to restrict the analysis to a relatively homogenous sample of firms. 
Existing empirical evidence shows that the performance of IPOs varies widely across the 
1594
 6
different industries (Ritter, 1991; Levis, 1993). Furthermore, Audretsch and Lehmann 
(2004) point out that firms in the new economy or knowledge based industries differ in 
their governance structure compared to traditional firms. Hensler, Rutherford and Springer 
(1997) and Lamberto and Rath (2008) also find that the survival likelihood of IPOs 
companies varies across the industries. Thus we justify our focus on the survival analysis 
of Australian IPOs within one particular sector, the new economy sector.  
Our results show that the survival time of new economy IPOs companies is negatively 
related to the percentage holdings of the top 20 shareholders in the firms. This suggests 
that a lower ownership concentration in new economy IPOs companies should be 
encouraged. In addition, company size and leverage are found to be negatively related to 
new economy IPO firms’ survival. Furthermore, we find that board size and board 
independence are insignificantly associated with new economy IPO companies’ survival. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies 
relating to corporate governance structure and IPOs survival and provides the theoretical 
background for the construction of variables. Section 3 presents the details on our data and 
the methodology, the Cox proportional hazards model, which has been employed in the 
paper. The empirical results are then presented and discussed in Section 4. Finally, our 
conclusion and possible future extensions are discussed in the last section. 
2. Literature Review and theoretical development  
We identified three types of factors that influence the survival of new economy IPO 
firms. These factors include: 1) corporate governance attributes; 2) offering characteristics; 
3) financial ratios and other company specific variables. 
2.1 Corporate Governance Attributes 
The development of agency theory suggests that there is a link between corporate 
governance and firm performance (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2004). If corporate 
governance influences corporate performance, then it should have some effect on corporate 
survival (Goktan, Kieschnick and Moussawi, 2006). Johnson et al. (2000) show that firms 
with weak corporate governance are vulnerable to economic downturns and increases the 
probability of falling into financial distress.  
In this study, we explore three areas of corporate governance - board size, board 




There are several theories in the literature regarding the relationship between board size 
and firm performance. On the one hand, small boards are more likely to monitor 
management better since their members are less able to hide in a large group (Fischer and 
Pollock, 2004). Furthermore, small groups are able to arrive at decisions more quickly than 
larger ones. Extant studies demonstrate that smaller boards are more likely to eliminate 
poorly performing CEOs (Certo, Daily and Dalton, 2001). Finally, Judge and Zeithaml 
(1992) find that smaller boards are more likely to be involved in strategy formation. They 
ascribe this result to a reduction in commitment and motivation of directors who are 
members of larger boards. Smaller boards are arguably more able to fulfil the monitoring 
role and have the advantage of speed in decision-making in their advising role.  
On the other hand, larger boards, however, have a potential advantage in their advising 
role and are more capable of accomplishing the resource-provision role of the board of 
directors. They have a greater potential for multiple perspectives, which can facilitate their 
advisory role. Furthermore, they may enjoy superior access to key resources (Goodstein, 
Gautam and Boeker, 1994). These advantages of larger boards may be particularly 
valuable to young, IPO firms (Fischer and Pollock, 2004). Dalton et al. (1999) conduct a 
meta-analysis of studies of board size and performance and conclude that there is a positive 
relationship between board size and financial performance. This implies that the 
advantages of access to additional resources due to the large board prevail over the 
additional agency costs and slower decision-making.  
These arguments advocate a positive relationship between board size and effectiveness 
in terms of possessing expertise and accessing resources but a negative relationship 
between board size and effectiveness in terms of the board’s capability to act rapidly in 
turbulent times and to monitor management (Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994). These 
contradictory relationships between board size and firm performance imply that the overall 
impact of board size on survival will depend on which of the board’s roles is most essential 
in a given circumstance.  
The firms in our setting can profit both from the speed with which small boards can 
arrive at decisions and take strategic action as well as benefit from a broader range of 
alternatives that large boards can spawn.  
Board Independence and CEO Influence 
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We believe that IPO firms facing economic turbulence are better served by a strong and 
independent board. Board independence defined as the percentage on non-executive 
directors serving on the board is taken to represent “Board Power”. Ostensibly, the extent 
to which a strong and independent board is able to implement its monitoring, advising, and 
resource provision roles effectively depends on the power held by the firm’s CEO. We 
think that if the CEO and Board are equally powerful then the IPO firm’s best interests are 
ill-served especially during tumultuous economic circumstances. There is near consensus 
among financial economists regarding the leadership structure of the board. The view is 
that the same person should not simultaneously hold the positions of CEO and chairperson 
of the board. Dual leadership structure or CEO duality exists when a firm’s CEO also 
serves as a chairman of the board of directors.  
A minority posit the notion that a combined CEO chairperson structure provides a 
“focal point” for leadership and precludes ambiguity regarding responsibility. However, 
the unifying power provided by duality of the leadership structure may be less beneficial 
when an IPO firm faces a period of decline prior to bankruptcy. Thus CEO power could be 
measures by the existence of duality in the leadership structure.  
It is interesting to note that in Australia, the Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
and Best Practice Recommendations issued by the Australian Stock Exchange deals 
directly with board structure and states that a company should structure the board to add 
value. In this regard, an independent director is ‘independent of management and free of 
any business or other relationship that could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere 
with the exercise of their unfettered and independent judgment’ (ASX, March 2003). 
Three of the ASX recommendations under Principle 2 are considered in this study. 
Recommendation 2.1 states that a majority of the board should be independent directors. 
Recommendation 2.2 is that the chairperson should be an independent director. Finally, the 
point of Recommendation 2.3 is that the roles of chairperson and chief executive officer 
should not be exercised by the same individual.  
Percentage of Independent Directors 
While the importance of board independence has been generally acknowledged, there 
is no common consensus regarding the definition of ‘independence’ (Brennan and 
McDermott, 2004; Kang, Cheng and Gray, 2007). Previous studies have used the word 
‘outside directors’ instead of ‘independence’ to describe directors who are presumed to be 
independent from management (Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2005). Some existing 
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studies simply consider the differences between ‘executive’ and ‘non-executive’ directors 
(Kang, Cheng and Gray, 2007; Lamberto and Rath, 2008). For the purpose of this study, all 
non-executive directors are classified as ‘independent directors’ following Lamberto and 
Rath (2008).  
Based on our arguments presented above, the percentage of independent directors on 
the board is expected to positively related to the likelihood of survival of an IPO firm. 
Dual Leadership Structure and Non-Executive Chairman 
The chairman is responsible for leading the board, for efficient organization and the 
conduct of the board’s function, and for briefing the directors in relation to issues arising at 
board meetings (ASX, March 2003). The board of directors is an economic institution that 
may help to reduce agency problems between managers and shareholders. The board 
provides management with contractual incentives and ensure the contracts are fulfilled by 
management (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2004). Of particular interest during times of 
financial decline is the resource provision role of the board. We therefore posit that a non-
executive chairman increases the survival likelihood of IPO firms.  
The evidence on the effect of CEO duality on corporate performance is mixed (Arthur 
et al., 1993; Pi and Timme, 1993). While some studies e.g. Jensen (1993), Rechner and 
Dalton (1991) and Daily and Dalton (1994b) argued that boards in which the chairperson 
and CEO are same person leads to ineffective boards, Elsayed (2007) found that CEO 
duality has no impact on corporate performance. However, CEO duality attracts a positive 
and significant coefficient only when corporate performance is low. 
Furthermore, Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) claimed that proponents of the dual 
leadership structure base their arguments on a mix of anecdotal evidence and an intuitive 
appeal to common sense. They suggested that there are both costs and benefits to a dual 
leadership structure. This structure may create a potential for rivalry between the CEO and 
the chairperson, making it difficult to pinpoint blame for poor performance1. 
Therefore, we test the proposition that a board led by an independent leader will better 
ensure the survival of the IPO firm during declining economic circumstances.  
Ownership Concentration 
                                               
1 In Australia, Recommendation 2.3 of the Principle of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
advocates the separation of the positions of CEO and chairperson. 
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Woo, Jeffrey and Lange (1995) found that low ownership concentration is related to 
corporate longevity and argued that their result is inconsistent with agency theory which 
linked firm performance to higher levels of owner retention. Kang, Cheng and Gray (2007) 
also found that ownership concentration is significantly negatively associated with an 
independent board of directors. This may imply that lower ownership concentration leads 
to a higher probability of firm survival. However, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found that 
corporate ownership concentration is not related to the accounting profit rates of a 
company. 
It can be seen that the conclusion regarding the effect of ownership concentration 
remaining on firm survival is unclear. In this study, ownership concentration is measured 
by the proportion of common stock held by the top 20 shareholders. This measurement is 
consistent with the studies discussed above. 
2.2 Offering Characteristics 
Existing literature employed offering characteristics of IPOs in examining IPOs post 
listing performance (Bhabra and Pettway, 2003), explaining initial return, long run return 
and the relationship between initial and seasoned offerings (Murgulov, 2006). This study 
uses offering characteristics data for investigating new economy Australian IPOs company 
survival. The variables details are follows. 
Offer Price 
Ho et al.(2001) indicated that IPOs are typically underpriced, that is, an investor who 
purchases new issues at the offering price can, on average, make relatively large returns. 
To compensate investors for the greater uncertainty, higher risk IPOs have higher initial 
returns. Therefore, IPOs with a higher ex ante uncertainty are more underpriced than those 
with lower ex ante uncertainty. This hypothesis is consistent with Lamberto and Rath 
(2008). Thus, we expect a positive relationship between offer price and IPOs survival. 
Offer Size  
The size of the offering is expected to be positively related to the firm’s survival.  It is 
argued that larger offerings signal market confidence, more stringent monitoring 
(Lamberto and Rath, 2008) and good prospects (Jain and Kini, 2000). Ritter (1991) 
suggested that smaller offers tend to have the worst aftermarket performance. Furthermore, 
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previous studies of American IPOs e.g. Hensler, Rutherford and Springer (1997) and Jain 
and Kini (1999) found that the size of offering is positively related to firm survival. 
Age at Offering 
Firm age has been used as a proxy for risk  (Ritter, 1991; Ho et al., 2001). Ritter (1991) 
found that older firms performed better in the after-market than younger ones. Established 
firms are expected to have a more stable source of business, be less speculative and also 
more likely to survive than young firms (Lamberto and Rath, 2008). Therefore, it is 
expected that the company age at offering should be positively related to its likelihood of 
survival.  
Retained Ownership 
Leland and Pyle (1977) argued that firm owners can signal quality in equity markets by 
retaining equity. Consistent with signal theory, a high percentage of insider ownership 
retention at IPOs serves as a certification that managerial decisions will coincide with the 
outside shareholder’s interest, which results in less agency costs and better firm 
performance after the offering (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
However, the empirical results are mixed. While Hensler, Rutherford and Springer 
(1997) suggested that IPOs firm with higher percentage of retained ownership have a 
longer survival period, Lamberto and Rath (2008) found that ownership retention is not 
significantly related to IPOs firm survival. We expect that the percentage of stock retained 
by pre-IPO shareholders is positively related to IPOs company survival.  
Underwriter Backing 
It is in the best interest of the underwriter to endorse companies with sound prospects 
and it is a fact that most underwriters invest in the offers they underwrite (Lamberto and 
Rath, 2008). Therefore, it is expected that companies with underwriter backing should be 
more likely to survive than those without. 
Auditor Reputation 
Auditor reputation is included as indicator variables with a value of one if the auditor is 
from one of the Big 5 accounting firms and zero otherwise. The Big 5 companies include 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Arthur Anderson, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and Ernst 
and Young (How, Izan and Monroe, 1995; Dimovski and Brooks, 2003; Lamberto and 
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Rath, 2008). Extant literature suggests that reputable auditors tend to lessen the amount of 
underpricing achieved by an IPO candidate since they are construed as providing a signal 
of the quality of information to potential investors (How and Yeo, 2000).  
Therefore, we expect that companies with an auditor from one of the Big 5 companies 
should have a higher likelihood of survival than those with an auditor from a smaller 
auditor firms. 
Number of Risk Factors in the Prospectus 
Risk can be proxied directly using the number of risk factors listed in the prospectus 
(Bhabra and Pettway, 2003). Assuming full disclosure, the number of risk factors listed in 
the prospectus should be negatively related to survival (Lamberto and Rath, 2008). Firms 
with more risk factors listed in the prospectus suggest a riskier firm and hence an increased 
likelihood of failure. The informational value of the number of risk factors was found to be 
significant negatively related to the likelihood of survival of American IPOs by Hensler, 
Rutherford and Springer (1997) and Bhabra and Pettway (2003). 
This study expects that the number of risk factors listed in the prospectus is negatively 
related to IPOs survival likelihood. 
2.3 Financial Ratios and Company Specific Variables 
Four categories of financial ratios are used in this study. The details are as follows. 
Liquidity Ratio 
The liquidity ratios measure a firm’s ability to meet its current obligations as they 
become due. Liquidity ratios also have been used to measure short term solvency. Higher 
levels of liquidity provide a strong barrier against financial failure. In this study, the 
current ratio is a measure of a firm’s liquidity. 
Profitability Ratio 
It is expected that companies with a high profitability ratio will have more likelihood of 
survival. This study utilizes return on asset (ROA) as a measure of profitability ratio. The 
profitability ratios measure the firm’s ability to generate earnings. Many firms face 
financial distress when their earning is negative. Therefore profit is often used as a 




Financial risk show the firm’s ability to find the sources of external funds provided for 
in the benefit of their shareholder. The degree of financial risk is related to the likelihood 
of financial distress (Lee and Yeh, 2004). It is expected that companies with a higher 
leverage are more likely to go bankrupt. Debt ratio is used as a measure of leverage in this 
study. 
Activity Ratio 
The activity ratios measure the efficiency of a firm’s asset utilization. They measure 
the ability of a firm to use assets to generate revenue or return. If firms can use assets 
efficiently, they will earn more revenue and increase liquidity. Total asset turnover ratio is 
employed in this study. 
Two variables measuring company specific characteristics are employed in the analysis as 
the following details. 
Company Size 
Prior literature has presented that firm survival is negatively correlated with firm size. 
The rationale for this relationship is that larger firms have more ability to avoid financial 
distress by using public equity markets (Goktan, Kieschnick and Moussawi, 2006). Schultz 
(1993) found an inverse relationship between the probability of delisting and firm size. 
Smaller firms have a higher probability of delisting and larger firms have a higher 
probability of survival. Therefore, it is expected that larger IPOs firms will survive longer 
than smaller ones. 
IPO_9900 
To examine the effect of IPO timing, a dummy variable is used indicating whether a 
company has issued stock between 1999 and April 2000. The definition of a variable is 
adapted from and Ho et al. (2001) and Kauffman and Wang (2007). We expect that 
companies that went public between 1999 and April 2000 are more likely to fail because 
April 2000 is the date generally recognized by Australian financial market participants as 
coinciding with the ‘bursting of the dot come bubble’ (Ho et al., 2001). 
Venture capital-backed IPOs 
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Barry et al. (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991), posit that VC-backing certifies 
the quality of the IPO. Their empirical evidence shows less underpricing for VC-backed 
firms as compared to non-VC-backed firms. Gompers (1995) in his study of venture 
capitalists shows that they specialize in collecting and evaluating information of start-up 
and growth companies. Furthermore, they tend to take substantial stakes in the IPO firms 
and frequently sit on the boards. Venture Capitalists can be an additional source of 
resource and advice during periods of economic duress faced by newly public firms. 




Table 1: The variables used in the study 
 
Variable Code Variable Name Definition of Variable 
 Corporate Governance Attributes:  
BD_SIZE Board Size Number of directors on the board including chairman. 
 Board Independence  
BD_INDP Percentage of Independent 
Directors 
The ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the number of directors, as listed in the prospectus. 
CM_NEXC Non-Executive Chairman  If the chairman listed in the prospectus is a non-executive director then a value of 1 is recorded, 0 otherwise. 
CM_DUAL Dual Leadership Structure If the chairman and CEO are different people then a value of 1 is recorded, 0 otherwise. 
 Ownership Concentration  
TOP20 Top 20 Shareholders The proportion of common stock held by the top 20 shareholders. 
 Offering Characteristics:  
OF_PRICE Offering Price The offer price listed in the prospectus, or the midpoint of the price range. 
OF_SIZE Offering Size The size of the offering listed in the prospectus, or the minimum subscription amount. 
OF_AGE Offering Age The difference between the year in which the prospectus was lodged and the year in which the company was founded. 
RETAIN Retained Ownership The difference between the market capitalization of the company after listing and the size of the offering, divided by the market 
capitalization of the company after listing. 
BACK Underwriter Backing  Initial public offerings which had an underwriter recorded a value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
BIG5 Auditor Reputation Initial public offerings which had an auditor belonging to one of the Big 5 Accounting firms recorded a value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
The Big 5 accounting firms include PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Arthur Anderson, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and Ernst and 
Young. 
NUM_RISK Number of Risk Factors in the 
Prospectus 
The number of risk factors listed in the prospectus. If there is no specific risk factor section, the number is 0. 
 Financial Ratios:  
PRO Profitability Return on Asset (ROA): Earnings before interest/(total assets-outside equity interests). 
LIQ Liquidity Ratio Current Ratio: Current assets/current liabilities. 
LEV Leverage Ratio Debt Ratio: Total debt/total assets. 
ACT Activity Ratio Total Asset Turnover: Operating revenue/total assets. 
 Company-Specific Variables:  
C_SIZE Company Size The logarithm of total assets of the firm. 
IPO_9900 IPO_9900 A dummy variable recorded a value of 1 if a company issued stock between 1999 and April 2000, 0 otherwise. 
VC_BACKED Venture Capital-Backed IPOs A dummy variable recorded a value of 1 if a company is a venture capital-backed IPO, 0 otherwise. 
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3.1 Data and Sample 
In this study, a new economy company is defined as an entity with business activities in 
any high technology production or service. In particular, IPOs in four industry sectors 
based on GICS2 include information technology; media3; telecommunication services and 
health care are examined. This definition of new economy company is consistent with 
Murgulov (2006). 
The new economy IPOs companies listed in Australia between 1994 and 2002 are 
included in estimating Cox proportional hazards model. 2002 is chosen as the cut off year 
because it allows five years of post-listing accounting information at the time of data 
collection. Each IPO company is tracked from the listing on ASX until 31 December 2007 
or until it is delisted or suspended.  
The sample of IPOs and their prospectuses are collected mainly from the Annual 
Reports Online database.  Some of the IPO prospectuses are not available on the Annual 
Reports Online database. In those cases, the prospectuses were obtained from the Connect 
4 Company Prospectuses database. Industry sector and financial information of the 
companies was obtained from the FinAnalysis database. 
In this study, non-survivors or failed companies are simply defined as companies 
which have been delisted or suspended from the ASX. Survivors are companies which 
remain trading on the ASX. This definition is consistent with Lamberto and Rath (2008) 
and Welbourne and Andrews (1996). Correspondingly, survival time is measured as the 
number of years between the year of listing and the year the company is delisted or 
suspended from the ASX for non-survivors IPOs companies or the year end of observation 
period for survivor IPOs companies. The final sample consists of 127 new economy 
Australian IPOs companies. Among these companies, 93 companies are survivors and 34 
companies are non-survivors. 
The distribution of new economy IPOs companies between 1994 and 2002 by industry 
sector and by company status is presented in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. 
                                               
2 GICS is an enhanced industry classification system jointly developed by Standard & Poor’s and 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) in 1991 to meet the needs of the investment community for a 
classification system that reflects a company’s financial performance and financial analysis (Standard and 
Poor's, 2002). 
3 According to GICS, media is an industry group rather than an industry sector. It belongs to the 
consumer discretionary industry sector. 
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Table 2: New economy IPOs companies listed between 1994 and 2002 stratified by 
GICS industry sector 
 
GICS Industry Sector N Percent 
Information Technology 55 43.31 
Media 13 10.24 
Telecommunication Services 14 11.02 
Health Care 45 35.43 
Total 127 100.00 
Note: N is the number of companies. Percent is the number of companies in a 
particular industry group as a proportion of total number of companies. 
 
Table 3: New economy IPOs companies listed between 1994 and 2002 stratified by 
company status 
 
Trading Status N Percent 
Trading 93 73.23 
Delisted 32 25.20 
Suspended 2 1.57 
Total 127 100.00 
Note: N is the number of companies. Percent is the number of companies in a 
particular industry group as a proportion of total number of companies. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
In order to analyze the factors influencing the survival of new economy Australian IPOs 
companies, we employed a Cox proportional hazards model which is a semi parametric 
model that uses survival analysis techniques.  
Existing literature has employed Cox proportional hazards model in IPOs survival 
analysis e.g. Kauffman and Wang (2001), Cockburn and Wagner (2007), Kauffman and 
Wang (2007) and Lamberto and Rath (2008). Other IPO survival studies used other 
techniques in survival analysis e.g. Weibull  model (Woo, Jeffrey and Lange, 1995; 
Audretsch and Lehmann, 2004), log-normal model (Woo, Jeffrey and Lange, 1995), log-
logistic (Hensler, Rutherford and Springer, 1997) and piecewise exponential model (Yang 
and Sheu, 2006). 
There exist two key advantages of survival analysis compared to the traditional 
methods e.g. MDA, logit and probit models. These advantages include that the ability to 
handle time-varying covariates and censored observations.  
In this context, time varying covariates are the explanatory variables that change with 
time. Financial ratios used in this study are time varying covariates as their values change 
over time. Censored observations are the observations that have never experienced the 
event during the observation time. Censoring occurs when the duration of the study is 
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limited in time.  In this study, censored observations are the IPO companies which are still 
trading on the ASX at the end of the observation period which is 31 December 2007.  
Survival analysis consists of two key functions called the survivor function and the 
hazard function. The survival function, S(t), gives the probability that the time until the 
firm experiences the event, T, is greater than a given time t. Given that T is a random 
variable which defines the event time for some particular observation, then the survival 
function is defined as. 
)Pr()( tTtS   (1) 
The hazard function defines the instantaneous risk of an event occurring at time t given 
the firm survives to time t. The hazard function is also known as the ‘hazard rate’ because 













The most widely used Cox proportional hazards (PH) model is a semi-parametric 
model for survival analysis. In the Cox (1972) study, there are two significant innovations 
including the proportional hazards model and maximum partial likelihood. The 
proportional hazards model is represented as 
)exp()()( 0 ii Xthth   (3) 
where h0(t) is an arbitrary unspecified baseline hazard rate which measures the effect 
of time on the hazard rate for an individual whose covariates all have values of zero. X 
represents the vector of covariates that influences the hazard and  is the vector of their 
coefficients.  
Equivalently, the regression model is written as  
log hi(t) = (t)+ 1Xi1 + 2Xi2 +... + kX ik (4) 
where (t) = logh0(t) and h0(t) is an arbitrary unspecified baseline hazard rate 
(LeClere, 2000). 
The model does not require the particular probability distribution specification of the 
survival times, but it possesses the property that different individuals have hazard functions 

























tih    (5) 
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The ratio of the hazard functions for two individuals does not vary with time t. These 
special properties make the Cox’s PH model robust and popular amongst researchers. 
To estimate the coefficients of , Cox (1972) proposes a partial likelihood function 
based on a conditional probability of failure by assuming that there are no tied values in the 
survival times. The function was later modified to handle ties (Efron, 1977). In this study, 
we use SAS PROC PHREG to conduct the estimation. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
In order to prevent the influence of observations with extreme values observations are 
truncated at the specified thresholds. All observations with covariate values higher than the 
ninety-ninth percentile of each covariate are set to that value. In the same way, all 
covariate values lower than the first percentile of each covariate are truncated. This 
procedure is similar to the one employed by Shumway (2001).  
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the data employed in the study after the 
truncation stratified by company status. The descriptive statistics include the number of 
observations, means, medians, min, max, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis for 
each company status which are presented in this section. It should be noted that because of 
the binary or dummy variables that have been used for some factors, the mean for these 
variables should be interpreted as the percentage of companies in the sample. The binary 
variables employed in this study include CM_NEXC, CM_DUAL, BACK, BIG5, 
IPO_9900, and VC-BACKED. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test, a non-parametric test, is employed for testing for significant 
differences between the group means. Variables with significant differences in their group 
means will be expected to add information to a regression analysis. The variables TOP20, 
OF_PRICE, BACK, C_SIZE and VC-BACKED display significant differences across the 
subsamples. 
According to Table 4, the mean number of directors for both survivor and non-
survivors new economy IPOs companies is five, which is consistent with Lamberto and 
Rath (2008) and Rosa, Izan and Lin (2004). Both studies find that the majority of IPO 
companies have less than six directors in the board which is the minimum number of 
directors recommended by the ASX for good governance.  The mean percentage of non-
executive directors on the board were 53.41 and 61.96 for active and non-survivor IPOs 
companies, respectively. This figure implies that the majority of directors in the new 
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economy Australian IPOs company board are independent directors. In addition, 64.42 and 
69.59 percent of active and non-survivor new economy IPO companies, respectively, have 
a non-executive chairman, and 85.51 and 84.80 percent of these companies have the 
positions of CEO and chairperson held by different persons. These results suggest that the 
majority of new economy Australian IPOs companies have boards which can be 
considered independent. Furthermore, the mean percentages of the top 20 shareholders for 
active and non-survivor companies are 65.98 and 76.77 percent, respectively. 
In terms of the offering characteristics, the median offering price is A$0.50 for the 
survivors and A$1.00 for the non-survivors. The median offer sizes are A$8 and A$12 
million and the medians of offering age are 3.04 and 4.51 years for the survivor and non-
survivor companies, respectively. These results suggest that the new economy Australian 
IPO companies are relatively young and small, consistent with the results reported by 
Lamberto and Rath (2008). 
Additionally, 73.98 and 90.06 percent of the offerings by active and non-survivor 
companies are underwritten while 53.16 and 70.18 percent of the offerings by active and 
non-survivor companies have an auditor from the one of the Big 5 accounting firms. On 
average, the number of risk factors identified in the prospectus were 13 and 14 for active 
and non-survivor companies, respectively. The means of retained ownership by pre-IPOs 
owners were 62.16 and 70.48 percent for active and non-survivor IPOs companies, 
respectively, which implies that the control of new economy IPO companies was retained 
by the original owners. It is also interesting to note that 39.52 and 35.67 percent of active 
and non-survivor IPOs companies are listed during the period 1999 to April 2000. 
The profitability ratios, which show the ability of the company to generate profit, are 
negative for both groups. The means of ROA for active and non-survivor companies are -
0.29 and -0.35, respectively. This result suggests that non-survivor IPOs companies have 
lower earnings than active companies. But the difference is not statistically significant. The 
liquidity ratio, CUR, of non-survivor companies have higher mean as compared to the 
active firm subsample. The means of DET indicates that the long term liability paying 
ability of non-survivor companies is less than that of active companies. For the activity 
ratio, TAT, the means of non-survivor companies is higher than those of the survivors. 
However, the Kruskal-Wallis test suggests that there is no difference in means of these 
ratios between active and non-survivor new economy IPO companies. 
The mean SIZE of active and non-survivor companies are 7.27 and 7.41, respectively. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test shows that, on average, the size of active and non-survivor new 
economy IPOs companies in our sample are statistically significantly different at the 10 
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percent level. Finally, the survivor and non-survivor samples significantly differ with 
respect to the percentage of firms backed by venture capitalists. 10.97% of survivors are 
backed by venture capitalists while 30.99% of the non-survivors have VC-backing. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients across the variables are shown in Table 5. The 
results suggest weak relationships across the variables. We do not find any large and 




Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the data 
 
 ROA CUR TAT DET C_SIZE IPO_9900 VC_BACKED 
















































































































































Note: Descriptive statistics grouped by company status. n is the number of companies. Kruskal-Wallis Test (a non-parametric test) for testing the equality of group means. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 5: Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 


































































































































































































































































































































17. C_SIZE                 1.0000 -0.0797 0.0179 
0.1066 
0.0015 
18. IPO9900                  1.0000 -0.0837 0.0129 
19. VC_BACKED                   1.0000 
Note: a. Pearson correlation coefficients. 
b. The p-value under the null hypothesis of zero correlation. 
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4.2 Cox Proportional Hazards Model Estimation Results 
We employ the Cox proportional hazards model to investigate the influence of 
corporate governance variables on the survival of new economy IPO companies. In 
addition to corporate governance variables, we also include offering characteristics, 
financial ratios and company-specific variables. The estimation results are presented in 
Table 5. 
We used the default specification for selecting the variables method in PROC PHREG 
procedure in SAS. The SAS PROC PHREG fits the complete model as specified in the 
MODEL statement. The covariates are selected from the full model (all variables were 
included in the model), instead of backward, forward or stepwise selection procedures. The 
results reported in Table 6 shows only significant covariates. 
 
Table 6: Estimation Results of Cox Proportional Hazards Model  
 
Note: *Significant at a 10 percent level. 
** Significant at a 5 percent level. 
 
Table 6 presents the coefficients estimated the standard error of this estimate, Wald 
chi-square tests with the relative p-value for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
of each covariate is equal to zero. Finally, the hazard ratio is presented in the last column. 
Hazard ratio is obtained by computing e where  is the coefficient in the proportional 
hazards model. A hazard ratio equal to 1 indicates that the covariate has no effect on 
survival. If the hazard ratio is greater (less) than 1, then this indicates a more rapid (slower) 
hazard timing.  
Based on p-values, only two variables are significant at the 5 percent level. These are 
TOP20 and C_ SIZE with coefficients of 0.0333 and 0.7265, respectively. The variables 
VC_BACKED and DET are statistically significant at the 10 percent level with estimated 
coefficients 0.7753 and 0.6205 respectively. The estimated coefficient of TOP20 is 
positive which suggests a positive relationship between the percentage holdings of the top 
20 shareholders of the company and failure risk. The estimated hazard ratio of TOP20 is 
Covariate Coefficient Standard Error 2 Statistic p-Value Hazard Ratio 
TOP20 0.0333** 0.0143 5.4307 0.0198 1.0340 
VC_BACKED 0.7753* 0.4582 2.8629 0.0906 2.1710 
DET 0.6205* 0.3181 3.8051 0.0511 1.8600 
C_SIZE 0.7265** 0.3329 4.7622 0.0291 2.0680 
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1.0340 which means that the financial distress risk of IPOs companies increases 3.40 
percent for each percentage increase in the holdings of the top 20 shareholders. This result 
is consistent with the findings of Woo, Jeffrey and Lange (1995) who suggested that low 
ownership concentration is related to corporate longevity. 
Considering financial ratios, DET is the only financial ratio which is statistically 
significant in explaining the survival of IPO firms. The parameter estimates are positive for 
DET, which means that the IPO companies with low debt ratio are less likely to fail. The 
estimated hazard ratio for DET is 1.8600 which indicates that for every unit increase in 
debt ratio, the risk of failing increases by 86 percent.  
For C_SIZE, the estimated coefficient is 0.7265. The positive sign of SIZE means that 
the larger the size of IPO companies, the higher the likelihood of companies entering into 
financial distress. This result is consistent with the findings of Lamberto and Rath (2008). 
A reasonable explanation for this result is that large companies might have inflexible 
organizations and have problems with monitoring managers and employees which leads to 
inefficient communication (Rommer, 2004) and subsequent failure.  
The estimated hazard ratio for the variable VC_BACKED is 2.1710 which means that 
the hazard of financial distress for venture capital-backed IPO companies is about 217.10 
percent of the hazard for non-venture capital-backed IPO companies. This result is 
contradictory to our expectations as the literature on venture capital-backed IPOs leads us 
to believe. Venture capital firms provide valuable certification and access to resources 
which should be valuable to VC-backed firms in times of distress as compared to 
companies without such backing. Our results resonate with that of Rosa, Velayuthen and 
Walter (2003) who do not find significant differences in the initial underpricing and long-
run share performance between venture capital-backed and non-VC-backed Australian 
IPOs. It appears that mere backing by venture capitalists does not guarantee a high quality 
issue.  
Summarising the results of this study, we find that new economy IPO companies with 
low ownership concentration, smaller value of total assets, low leverage and those that are 
not VC-backed are more likely to survive.  
Furthermore, our results indicate that mere compliance with the Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations published by the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council in March 2003 do not guarantee survival of the firms. The 
principal recommendations such as that a majority of the board should be independent 
directors (Recommendation 2.1), the chairperson should be an independent director 
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(Recommendation 2.2) and the roles of chairperson and chief executive officer should not 
be exercised by the same individual (Recommendation 2.3) do not significantly alter the 
IPO firms’ chance of survival during particularly difficult financial circumstances. 
The expected effect and the estimated effect are summarized in Table 7. The table 
shows that only DET has the expected sign while VC_BACKED and C_SIZE have exactly 
the opposite sign. 
 
Table 7: Summary of estimated effects of variables on financial distress probability 
 
 
Variable Expected effect Estimated effect 
TOP20 Unclear + 
VC_BACKED + - 
DET + + 
C_SIZE - + 
 
4.3 IPO Companies Survival Probability Evaluation  
The survival function, shown in Equation (1), which defines the survival probability 
can be estimated from the model to identify the probability that a company will survive 
longer than t time units. The survival profiles of a typical non-survivor and survivor by 
survival time and by calendar year are presented in Figures 1 and 2 respectively.  
The survival function shown in both figures is produced by averaging the estimated 
survival probability of companies by company status, non-survivor and survivor 
companies. It can be inferred that the survival probabilities of typical failed IPO companies 
are lower than those of typical active IPO firms. Since the survival function denotes a 
company’s probability of surviving past time t, it starts with 1.00 and declines as more 
companies fail. The graph shows that the survival probability of non-survivor companies is 
lower than the active companies and as time goes by, the survival probabilities for both 
start to decrease.  
According to Figure 1, the dramatic decrease in survival probability for new economy 
non-survivor companies occurs at 7 years after IPO with a probability of 65.77 percent, 
then the survival probability increases slightly after year 8 and continuously drops after 
year 9. The non-survivor new economy IPO companies trade on the ASX for no longer 
than 10 years. For active or survivor companies, the noticeable decrease of survival 
probability occurs after 10 years since the companies going public with the probability of 
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survival being around 71.47 percent. For non-survival companies, the survival probability 
that the companies will survive beyond 10 years after IPOs is around 54.63 percent.  
Considering Figure 2, the probability of new economy non-survivor companies started 
to drop steeply from 1998 until 2000 which coincides with the crash of new economy 
sector in April 2000. After this, the survival probability of these companies rose 
throughout 2001 and 2002. The dramatic drop of survival probability before 2000 could be 
interpreted cautiously in two ways: Firstly, the significant downturn in the market at the 
end of March 2000 (Johnston and Madura, 2002) influenced the low survival probability of 
typical new economy IPO companies. In other words, the survival probability of IPO 
companies could be affected by the abrupt weakening of the market. Secondly, these 
companies consist of the companies which have been listed for the few years before 2000, 
the survival probability of these companies declines over time. Consequently, the survival 
probability of average non-survival companies before 2000 has decreased. 
In addition, new economy active IPO companies experienced low survival probability 
before the period of a diminished new economy sector. The survival probability at 1999 is 
approximately 96.73 percent. However, companies that could withstand the market decline 
were able to recover, and their survival probability slightly increases throughout 2000 to 
97.99 percent. 
It should be noted that the results for the years 2003 to 2007 are not comparable to the 
years 1994 to 2002 because no fresh IPO companies were included in the analysis after 
2002. During the period 2003 to 2007, the survival probability of non-survivor IPOs 




Figure 1: Graph of survival function versus survival time by company status 
 
 
Figure 2: Graph of survival function versus calendar year by company status 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our study explores the relationship between corporate governance attributes and the 
survival likelihood of new economy Australian IPO firms utilising the Cox proportional 
hazards model. We focus our attention on three main areas of corporate governance 
deemed to be most important by regulators and other market participants. These corporate 
governance mechanisms include board size, board independence and ownership 
concentration. Control variables such as offering characteristics, financial ratios and 
company specific variables are incorporated in the model.  
Our results indicate that the ownership concentration is negatively related to new 
economy IPO firms’ survival. This contradicts the tenets of agency theory which suggests 
that a firm is more likely to survive if ownership concentration is high. This is because 
shareholders with significant holdings are more likely to have an influence on 
management’s decisions and they will expend more monitoring costs as their stake in the 
firm increases (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, consistent with Woo, Jeffrey and 
Lange (1995) we find that low ownership concentration is associated with higher 
likelihood of survival. They argued that lower ownership concentration, where stock of the 
firm is more widely held, could facilitate more effective capital raisings from a wider 
investment group, which makes the company less likely to fail.  
Conventional wisdom that “smart money” is associated with superior performance 
does not seem to hold here. In the aftermath of the internet shakeout, sophisticated 
investors were as clueless as naïve investors. This is also shown by the weak evidence 
indicating that VC-backing is associated with higher likelihood of failure. In fact, “dumb” 
investors seem to have done better than their smart counterparts.  
Our results also suggest that new economy IPO companies with small company size 
and low leverage are more likely to survive. The finding that low leverage is associated 
with greater survival likelihood is consistent with conventional wisdom. It is not clear why 
small size firms are more likely to succeed. However, our results do not support the 
proposition that good governance is related to corporate survival. We find that board size 
and board independence have an insignificant impact on new economy IPO firms’ 
survival.  
Corporate governance mechanisms are designed specifically to protect minority 
shareholders and other providers of external capital. They seem to be of no value during 
periods of extreme financial distress. Further research regarding corporate governance 
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attributes should investigate the characteristics of boards in more detail by including 
information on the experience of directors in the particular industry sector, the number of 
meetings held by the boards, and board remuneration. Perhaps, the structure of the board is 
less important compared to the incentives of the board in ensuring survival during 
particularly difficult periods. Finally, as stated in Principle 9 of the ASX, perhaps 
companies need to adopt remuneration policies that attract and maintain talented and 
motivated directors and employees to encourage enhanced company performance. More 
research on this key issue is likely to enhance our knowledge of the factors influencing 





Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S. and Sengupta, P. 2005, 'The association between outside directors, 
institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts', 
Journal of Accounting Research, 43(3), 343-376. 
Arthur, N., Garvey, G., Swan, P. and Taylor, S. 1993, 'Agency theory and "management 
research": A comment', Australian Journal of Management, 18(1), 93-102. 
ASX March 2003, Principles of good corporate governance and best practice 
recommendations, ASX Corporate Governance Council. 
Audretsch, D. B. and Lehmann, E. E. 2004, The effects of experience, ownership, and 
knowledge on IPO survival: Empirical evidence from Germany, Discussion Paper, 
The Group Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy, Jena, Germany. 
Barry, C. B., Muscarella, C. J., Peavy, J. W. and Vetsuypens, M. R. 1990, 'The role of 
venture capital in the creation of public companies: Evidence from the going-public 
process', Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 447-471. 
Bhabra, H. S. and Pettway, R. H. 2003, 'IPO prospectus information and subsequent 
performance', Financial Review, 38(3), 369-397. 
Brennan, N. and McDermott, M. 2004, 'Alternative perspectives on independence of 
directors', Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 325-336. 
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L. and Jarrell, G. 1997, 'Leadership structure: Separating the CEO 
and chairman of the board', Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(3), 189-220. 
Certo, S. T., Daily, C. M. and Dalton, D. R. 2001, 'Signaling firm value through board 
structure: An investigation of initial public offerings', Entrepreneurship: Theory & 
Practice, 26(2), 33-50. 
Cockburn, I. M. and Wagner, S. 2007, Patents and the survival of internet-related IPOs, 
Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Cox, D. R. 1972, 'Regression models and life-tables', Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society. Series B (Methodological), 34(2), 187-220. 
Daily, C. M. and Dalton, D. R. 1994a, 'Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact 
of board composition and structure', Academy of Management Journal, 37(6), 
1603-1617. 
Daily, C. M. and Dalton, D. R. 1994b, 'Corporate governance and the bankrupt firm: An 
empirical assessment', Strategic Management Journal, 15(8), 643-654. 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L. and Ellstrand, A. E. 1999, 'Number of directors 
and financial performance: A meta-analysis', Academy of Management Journal, 
42(6), 674-686. 
Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. 1985, 'The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and 
consequences', The Journal of Political Economy, 93(6), 1155-1177. 
Dimovski, W. and Brooks, R. 2003, 'Financial characteristics of Australian initial public 
offerings from 1994 to 1999', Applied Economics, 35(14), 1599 - 1607. 
Dowell, G. W. S., Shackell, M. B. and Stuart, N. V. 2007, The board of directors and firm 
survival: Evidence from the internet shakeout, Working Paper, Johnson Graduate 
School of Business, Cornell University, New York. 
Efron, B. 1977, 'The efficiency of Cox's likelihood function for censored data', Journal of 
the American Statistical Association, 72(359), 557-565. 
Elsayed, K. 2007, 'Does CEO duality really affect corporate performance?' Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15(6), 1203-1214. 
Fischer, H. M. and Pollock, T. G. 2004, 'Effects of social capital and power on surviving 
transformational change: The case of initial public offerings', Academy of 
Management Journal, 47(4), 463-481. 
1620
 32
Goktan, M. S., Kieschnick, R. and Moussawi, R. 2006, Corporate governance and 
corporate survival, Working Paper, University of Texas at Dallas. 
Gompers, P. A. 1995, 'Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital', 
Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1461-1489. 
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K. and Boeker, W. 1994, 'Research notes and communications the 
effects of board size and diversity on strategic change', Strategic Management 
Journal, 15(3), 241-250. 
Hensler, D. A., Rutherford, R. C. and Springer, T. M. 1997, 'The survival of initial public 
offerings in the aftermarket', Journal of Financial Research, 20(1), 93-110. 
Ho, B., Taher, M., Lee, R. and Fargher, N. L. 2001, Market sentiment, media hype and the 
underpricing of initial public offerings: The case of Australian technology IPOs, 
Working Paper, School of Accounting, University of New South Wales. 
How, J. C. Y., Izan, H. Y. and Monroe, G. S. 1995, 'Differential information and the 
underpricing of initial public offerings: Australian evidence', Accounting & 
Finance, 35(1), 87-105. 
How, J. C. Y. and Yeo, J. J. L. 2000, 'The pricing of underwriting services in the 
Australian capital market', Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 8(3-4), 347-373. 
Jain, B. A. and Kini, O. 1999, 'The life cycle of initial public offering firms', Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 26(9-10), 1281-1307. 
Jain, B. A. and Kini, O. 2000, 'Does the presence of venture capitalists improve the 
survival profile of IPO firms?' Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
27(9/10), 1139-1176. 
Jensen, M. C. 1993, 'The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal 
control systems', The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. 1976, 'Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure', Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-
360. 
Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A. and Friedman, E. 2000, 'Corporate governance in the 
Asian financial crisis', Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2), 141-186. 
Johnston, J. and Madura, J. 2002, 'The performance of internet firms following their initial 
public offering', Financial Review, 37(4), 525-550. 
Judge, W. Q. and Zeithaml, C. P. 1992, 'Institutional and strategic choice perspectives on 
board involvement in the strategic decision process', Academy of Management 
Journal, 35(4), 766-794. 
Kang, H., Cheng, M. and Gray, S. J. 2007, 'Corporate governance and board composition: 
Diversity and independence of Australian boards', Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15(2), 194-207. 
Kauffman, R. J. and Wang, B. 2001, The success and failure of dotcoms: A multi-method 
survival analysis, Information and Decision Sciences, Carlson School of 
Management, University of Minnesota. 
Kauffman, R. J. and Wang, B. 2007, Duration of internet firms: A semiparametric Cox and 
baysian survival analysis, Working Paper, Carlson School of Management, 
University of Minnesota. 
Lamberto, A. P. and Rath, S. 2008, The survival of initial public offerings in Australia, 
Working Paper, Curtin University of Technology. 
LeClere, M. J. 2000, 'The occurrence and timing of events: Survival analysis applied to the 
study of financial distress', Journal of Accounting Literature, 19, 158-189. 
LeClere, M. J. 2005, 'Time-dependent and time-invariant covariates within a proportional 
hazards model: A financial distress application', Review of Accounting and 
Finance, 4(4), 91-109. 
1621
 33
Lee, T.-S. and Yeh, Y.-H. 2004, 'Corporate governance and financial distress: Evidence 
from Taiwan', Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 378-388. 
Leland, H. E. and Pyle, D. H. 1977, 'Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and 
financial intermediation', Journal of Finance, 32(2), 371-387. 
Levis, M. 1993, 'The long-run performance of initial public offerings: The UK experience 
1980-1988', Financial Management, 22(1), 28-41. 
Luoma, M. and Laitinen, E. 1991, 'Survival analysis as a tool for company failure 
prediction', Omega, 19(6), 673-678. 
Megginson, W. L. and Weiss, K. A. 1991, 'Venture capitalist certification in initial public 
offerings', Journal of finance, 46(3), 879-903. 
Murgulov, Z. 2006, 'New economy initial and seasoned equity offers in Australia', PhD 
thesis, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Griffith Business 
School, Griffith University. 
Pi, L. and Timme, S. G. 1993, 'Corporate control and bank efficiency', Journal of Banking 
& Finance, 17(2-3), 515-530. 
Rechner, P. L. and Dalton, D. R. 1991, 'CEO duality and organizational performance: A 
longitudinal analysis', Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 155-160. 
Ritter, J. R. 1991, 'The long-run performance of Initial Public Offerings', The Journal of 
Finance, 46(1), 3-27. 
Rommer, A. D. 2004, Firms in financial distress: An exploratory analysis, Working paper 
no. 17, Danmarks Nationalbank and Centre for Applied Microeconometrics 
(CAM), Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Rosa, R. d. S., Izan, H. Y. and Lin, M. 2004, 'Board characteristics of Australian IPOs: An 
analysis in light of the ASX best practice recommendations', Australian Accounting 
Review, 14(1), 25-32. 
Rosa, R. d. S., Velayuthen, G. and Walter, T. 2003, 'The sharemarket performance of 
Australian venture capital-backed and non-venture capital-backed IPOs', Pacific-
Basin Finance Journal, 11, 197–218. 
Schultz, P. 1993, 'Unit initial public offerings : A form of staged financing', Journal of 
Financial Economics, 34(2), 199-229. 
Shumway, T. 2001, 'Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: A simple hazard model', 
Journal of Business, 74(1), 101-124. 
Standard and Poor's 2002, Understanding GICS, New York. 
Van der Goot, T., Van Giersbergen, N. and Botman, M. 2008, 'What determines the 
survival of internet IPOs?' Applied Economics, 99999(1), 1 - 15. 
Welbourne, T. M. and Andrews, A. O. 1996, 'Predicting the performance of initial public 
offerings: Should human resource management be in the equation?' Academy of 
Management Journal, 39(4), 891-919. 
Woo, L.-A. E., Jeffrey, A. M. and Lange, H. P. 1995, 'An examination of survival rates of 
newly listed firms in Australia', Research in Finance, 12, 217-229. 
Yang, C.-Y. and Sheu, H.-J. 2006, 'Managerial ownership structure and IPO survivability', 
Journal of Management and Governance, 10(1), 59-75. 
 
 
1622
